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Deaf by Design: Disability and Impartiality 
 
Introduction 
 
In ‘Benefit, Disability and the Non-Identity Problem’, Hallvard Lillehammer 
uses the case of a couple who chose to have deaf children to argue against 
the view that impartial perspectives can provide an exhaustive account of the 
rightness and wrongness of particular reproductive choices.1 His conclusion is 
that the traditional approach to the non-identity problem leads to erroneous 
conclusions about the morality of creating disabled children. This paper will 
show that Lillehammer underestimates the power of impartial perspectives 
and exaggerates the ethical force of partial perspectives, which in turn 
commits him to providing weak justifications for the choice made by the 
couple in his example case.  
 
 The non-identity problem concerns how we should make ethical evaluations 
when the person or object in question will owe its identity to the particular 
evaluation that we make. Lillehammer’s strategy is to provide six different 
cases of non-identity problems, three of which also involve pre-conception 
scenarios where the identity of a particular creature is involved. (His marriage 
example, although it doesn’t involve reproduction, is also an unusual type of 
preconception scenario, although in this case the ‘conception’ results in a 
marriage.) His main device in the analysis of these cases is “a contrast 
between two distinctions, namely the distinction between person-involving and 
non-person-involving considerations on the one hand, and between partial 
and impartial considerations on the other.”2 Lillehammer sets out the 
background to the non-identity problem in some detail, but his assertion that 
“some non-person-involving ethical considerations are essentially partial” is 
not supported by the examples he provides.3 Those of his examples that 
necessarily involve partial non-person-involving ethical considerations do not 
                                                 
1 H. Lillehammer. 2005. Benefit, Disability and the Non-Identity Problem. In N. Athanassoulis 
(ed.) Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics, Palgrave Macmillan. Online at: 
http://www.palgrave.com/pdfs/1403945276.pdf  
2 Ibid., 25. 
3 Ibid., 28. 
involve the creation of agents with interests; those that do involve agents with 
interests can be resolved without recourse to partial considerations. 
 
 
The hammer, the painting, the puppy, the marriage and the superhuman 
 
 Lillehammer’s first example is a hammer that he fashions out of steel and 
wood to repair the floor in his boatshed. Because he chose a piece of wood 
that is not suited to this task, it takes him a lot of time and effort to finish the 
job; if he had chosen the other piece of wood his job would have been easier. 
Was he wrong to make the tool that he did? Lillehammer thinks that “even 
with a hammer it is not obvious that I am subject to justified criticism for not 
maximising benefit impartially.”4 His point is that, although we can certainly 
say it would have been better from a prudential partial perspective to make a 
different hammer, making the bad hammer is not subject to criticism on 
impartial grounds. Thus we have a non-person-involving situation where 
partial perspectives are more helpful. We can already see Lillehammer’s 
strategy: he wants to show that partial considerations can trump impartial 
considerations. The hammer example shows that this is indeed true for cases 
where the agent is creating something that has no interests and is created 
purely for the agent’s benefit. However, it is a huge leap from this to arguing 
that partial considerations can trump impartial considerations when the agent 
is creating another agent with interests that is not created purely for the 
original agent’s benefit, as in the case of creating deaf children. Lillehammer 
attempts to make a series of large jumps through his subsequent examples, 
rather than making this leap all at once, but the hammer case highlights the 
fundamental flaw in his argument. 
 
 The second example given is the gift case: Salvador, a surrealist painter, 
creates a painting in the style of Canaletto as a gift for his friend Pablo. The 
recipient of the painting is delighted, but the fact remains that the painting is 
not a prime example of Salvador’s work, and an alternative in his own style 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 30. 
would be of greater worth. Yet if he had done this instead, “the Canaletto 
imitation would never have existed.”5 Once again, we have a non-person-
involving case where the agent is not open to criticism for creating a 
suboptimal object. The only real difference from the hammer case is that 
Pablo, another agent, is involved, and the same criticism applies: there is a 
fundamental distinction between creating objects without interests, and 
creating agents with interests, regardless of whether these agents are yet 
identifiable as persons. 
 
 In the third example, we are presented with the creation of an agent with 
interests: a puppy named Eric. Of all Lillehammer’s examples, this is the one 
which most closely resembles the case of the deaf children. Here we have a 
dog who is loved and happy, yet is “not well equipped to survive in an 
unprotected environment…prone to pick up diseases, a bad hunter and afraid 
of things large, noisy and threatening.”6 Once again, Lillehammer argues that 
this is another bad candidate for purely impartial evaluation, as such a 
perspective would conclude that Eric is a suboptimal puppy, and a ‘better’ 
puppy could have been created instead. This is true. But an impartial 
perspective would not necessarily assert that another puppy should have 
been created instead. As Lillehammer says, “Eric is a perfectly normal pet”.7 
The hammer and gift cases are different from the deaf case because they do 
not involve the creation of agents with interests; the pet case is different 
because it involves a perfectly normal creation who is prone to disease, while 
the deaf case involves the intentional creation of children who have a disease. 
I will return to this point later in the paper. (Also, it might be argued that there 
is less of an obligation to create optimal pets than there is to create optimal 
persons, if we accept that pets exist primarily for our benefit.) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 31. 
7 Ibid., 32. 
  A marriage constitutes Lillehammer’s fourth example: Javi and Pilar are 
happily married, but “the differences between their social backgrounds are a 
constant source of tension.”8 If they had married different people, the resulting 
partnerships could have been tensionless. Quite apart from the fact that this 
example reduces to saying ‘two people who are happily married might have 
been ever so slightly more happily married with other people who they never 
met’, Lillehammer has stacked the deck: this particular marriage is indeed a 
poor candidate for impartial evaluation, because the couple are happy and in 
love. We can’t impartially say that they should have tried to meet other 
people, because, as Lillehammer puts it, “Love does not consist in maximising 
impartial benefit”.9 However, if Javi and Pilar were both unhappy and 
conducting affairs, we could quite easily say from an impartial perspective that 
they shouldn’t have got married. (Also, an utterly blind impartial perspective, 
as uncharitably characterised by Lillehammer, might well say ‘They should 
each have married someone else, because then we would have twice as 
many happy marriages as we currently have with them married to each 
other.’) It is a given that impartial perspectives won’t have anything interesting 
to say in a situation where both or all agents are happy because of a situation 
that they entered into willingly (note that the deaf children, unlike Javi and 
Pilar, cannot consent to being deaf; although there was a chance they would 
have been able to hear with the chosen sperm donor, they would not exist 
had their parents chosen differently). Lillehammer’s strategy, here as before, 
seems to consist in saying ‘Here is a situation where X exists, and X is not 
quite 99% perfect. Does this mean that the creators of X should have created 
Y instead?’ This is a straw man: what we need, and get in the case of the deaf 
children, is: ‘Here is a situation where X exists, and is missing something very 
important.’ In all his cases except that of the deaf children, the agent or object 
created is suboptimal only in a very minor sense, and in a way that is 
compatible with its fulfilling its purpose or being happy. As will emerge, 
however, the deaf case involves suboptimality of fundamentally unfair 
proportions. 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 33. 
9 Ibid. 
 Lillehammer’s penultimate example involves a couple, Jack and Jill, who are 
offered a pill that will endow any child that they conceive with superhuman 
intelligence. They refuse the pill, conceive naturally, and have a normal child. 
Lillehammer argues here that, from an impartial perspective, “it might seem 
obvious that normal healthy children should never be conceived if 
superhuman children could be caused to exist instead.”10 From the point of 
view of the beneficence principle – we should try to create more benefit rather 
than less - this is true. But we do not have an obligation to enhance our 
children beyond the norm, and an impartial perspective can easily 
accommodate an obligation to avoid harm (the nonmaleficence principle) 
without an accompanying obligation to provide benefit beyond the norm. An 
impartial principle could simply have as a condition the eradication of serious 
genetic disease. (I have argued elsewhere that there are independent 
reasons why enhancement is unethical, but removal of disease is not.[Genetic 
Morality].) Lillehammer goes on to argue that:  
 
…the very existence of many of the aspects of their social world that Jack and Jill 
value most is premised on the fact that in their contingent historical 
circumstances most normal parents are happy to have normal children. To 
respect these aspects of the social world does not amount to fetishising normality 
for its own sake. As shown in the gift case and the pet case, it is possible to 
reasonably maintain an attitude of intrinsic valuation toward objects which fall 
short of perceived perfection in an indefinite number of ways.11 
 
I will return to this passage in the next section, but several preliminary points 
can be made here. First, it could be argued that any parent who is not happy 
to have a normal child is by definition not a normal parent. Second, wanting 
your child to be deaf is different from wanting your child to be normal. And 
third, the last sentence here is equivalent to saying ‘something that is not 
perfect can nonetheless be valuable’, which is something of a truism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 34. 
11 Ibid. 
The deaf case 
 
Given the centrality of his last example, a real case, to Lillehammer’s 
argument, it seems only fair to give it in full: 
 
Consider Sharon and Candace, a deaf couple unable to conceive naturally. Both 
being successful health professionals, Sharon and Candace have access to 
expensive private IVF treatment. Using a sperm donor with five generations of 
deafness in his family, Sharon and Candace successfully conceive and bring to 
term two congenitally deaf children. If Sharon and Candace had chosen a normal 
sperm donor, they could have had a hearing child. But then their actual children 
would not have existed. While both children are congenitally deaf, they are 
otherwise healthy. Were Sharon and Candice [sic] wrong to have deaf 
children?12 
 
Lillehammer’s defense of the couple’s decision has several aspects to it. First, 
he argues that “a contrary decision on the part of Sharon and Candace would 
entail that two worthwhile lives would never have been. While deafness is a 
serious disability, there is reason to believe that the children of Sharon and 
Candace would rather be deaf than not have existed at all”.13 First of all, there 
was a 50% chance that their children would have been born hearing anyway, 
even with a deaf sperm donor (see below). But even were this not the case, 
this phrasing is ambiguous: Lillehammer seems to imply that the only contrary 
decision would have been to have no children, rather than to try to conceive 
non-deaf children. It is obvious that a deaf child would rather be deaf than 
never have existed, but an impartial account might claim that it would be 
better for Sharon and Candace to have had non-deaf children. As Derek Parfit 
has pointed out, a woman who has an abortion might well have a child at a 
later date that she would never have conceived if she hadn’t aborted the 
earlier fetus.14 Choosing not to have a particular child doesn’t mean that 
another one will not end up being born in its stead. There could have been 
two other worthwhile lives if Candace and Sharon had tried (via a non-deaf 
sperm donor) for normal children, or if their children had been lucky enough to 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 34-5. 
13 Ibid., 35. 
14 D. Parfit. 1987. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: O.U.P: 358. 
not inherit deafness from the actual deaf donor. Furthermore, Lillehammer’s 
first argument is insufficient to justify a reproductive choice: it could also be 
used to justify having babies in order to make slaves of them, as David Shaw 
has argued with regard to cloning: 
 
Imagine an immortal society where children are only born to fulfil the society’s need 
for slaves. Children are brought up normally, but on reaching adulthood are 
enslaved for five years before joining the equal members of society. During this 
time, they are occasionally whipped, but otherwise live quite comfortably working 
for their betters. Overall, their lives are worth living. Now, if we conquer and abolish 
this society, it will result in people with lives worth living not being born. But we will 
still have done the right thing.15 
 
Second, Lillehammer returns to the idea that was introduced in the 
superhuman case: “Sharon and Candace make their choice in a particular 
personal and historical context. Like all prospective parents, they make that 
choice partly in light of partial ethical concerns. Thus, Sharon and Candace 
would like their children to grow up and flourish as members of their own 
community.”16 Thus, just as Jack and Jill should not be criticised for wanting a 
normal child, given their ‘normal’ context, Sharon and Candace should not be 
criticised for wanting a deaf child, given their ‘deaf’ context. Once again, we 
might ask why members of a slavery cult should be criticised for wanting a 
slave child, given their ‘slave context’. But even taken on its own terms, 
Lillehammer’s argument fails. He states that the couple, who are part of a 
thriving deaf community, want their children to be able to communicate with 
their deaf peers without feeling alienated. The most obvious response is that 
this argument has the hidden premise that being part of a flourishing deaf 
community precludes not being deaf. The couple’s child could still learn sign 
language and be part of the community without being deaf, unless the 
community itself is guilty of discrimination against those who are not deaf. (A 
more frivolous response, given that Candace and Sharon are lesbians, might 
be to ask whether, if they are part of a thriving gay/lesbian community, it 
                                                 
15 D. Shaw. 2006. Genetic Morality. Berne: Peter Lang Publishers: 74. 
16 Lillehammer, op. cit., 35. 
would be acceptable to select an sperm donor who had a history of 
homosexuality in the family in order to make their child gay.)  
 
 In further support of the couple, Lillehammer argues that “there is an ethically 
relevant difference between risks due to natural accident and risks due to 
social prejudice, for example. It is at least arguable [again] that Sharon and 
Candace have adopted such a critical perspective. Consequently, it is not so 
wrong that they wanted to select for deaf children.”17 Here he is talking about 
risks that the deaf children might run due to their disability if faced with natural 
disaster or discrimination, and it is true that there is a difference between risks 
due to discrimination and risks due to natural chance. But this ethically 
relevant distinction can also be used to differentiate between conceiving deaf 
children by accident (whether due to a recessive gene or physical 
abnormality) and conceiving them deliberately through sperm donation. As 
already mentioned, Candace and Sharon seem to be guilty of some type of 
discrimination against the non-deaf community, personified in the form of the 
non-deaf children they might have had; they assume that a non-deaf person 
could never participate in the deaf community.  In fact, it seems likely that 
deaf children would be more alienated from the non-deaf community than 
non-deaf children fluent in sign language would be from the deaf community. 
(Candace argues that “black people have harder lives [because of 
discrimination]. Why shouldn’t parents be able to go ahead and pick a black 
donor if that’s what they want?”18 But black people’s lives are harder because 
of the negative attitudes of other people: deaf people’s lives are harder, even 
without discrimination, because they are disabled and cannot hear.) 
Lillehammer writes that “the existence of special forms of communication like 
sign language and lip reading enables deaf people to participate in a valuable 
form of social life without removing their particular disability.”19 Equally, 
however, sign language and lip reading enable non-deaf people to participate 
in deaf people’s valuable form of social life without having their particular 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 36. 
18 L. Mundy. 2002. A World of Their Own. Washington Post 3 March. 
19 Lillehammer, op. cit., 36. 
disability. Why assume that deafness is a necessary condition for participation 
in the deaf community?  
 
 Another important point is that a deaf child would almost certainly be 
excluded from any musical community. To non-deaf people, this seems to be 
a great sacrifice to make in order to ensure integration into a particular 
disabled community. What makes this sacrifice worse is that Sharon and 
Candace have never fully experienced music, or anything else aural. 
(Lillehammer does not mention it, but Sharon was born with residual hearing 
which vanished by the age of 8, and Candace was born deaf.) The couple 
have decided to deprive their children of something of which they have next to 
no experience. In this particular case, the couple’s disability precludes them 
from knowing what their children’s lives would be like if they could hear: this 
alone ought to disqualify them from choosing such a life for their child. 
Candace herself acknowledged that “if they themselves – valuing sight – were 
to have a deaf child…they would probably try to have it fixed, if they could.20 
This indicates the lack of perspective that affected the couple’s decision to 
have deaf children: they don’t know what it’s like to be blind, but they know 
that it’s bad; the fact that they are deaf, though, blinds them to the fact that 
deafness is also a harm to be avoided if possible. (Somewhat ironically, 
Candace majored in medical ethics.) This is a microcosm of the problem: they 
are incapable of impartiality about hearing versus deafness, because they 
have only experienced the negative (deaf) perspective; not being blind, they 
have only experienced the positive perspective of sight. If they can easily 
judge blindness to be a harm, it can only be a lack of moral imagination that 
stops them from viewing deafness in the same way. Candace also stated that 
“I want to be the same as my child…I want the baby to enjoy what we 
enjoy.”21 This almost seems like an admission: the child could have been non-
deaf, but Candace can’t be, so she wants a deaf child. Why not try for a 
hearing child that can enjoy what the couple enjoys, and much more besides? 
In their seminal Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James 
                                                 
20 Mundy, op. cit. 
21 Ibid. 
Childress mention  the substituted judgement standard, where the surrogate 
must choose what the patient would choose for him or herself, if capable:  
 
…if the surrogate can reliably answer the question, “What do the patient want in 
this circumstance?” substituted judgement is an appropriate standard. But if the 
surrogate can only answer the question, “What do you want for the patient?” then 
this standard is inappropriate, because all connection to the patient’s former 
autonomy has vanished.22 
 
Although this standard is intended for patients who have already lived, and 
not for pre-conception scenarios, we can still see that Candace and Sharon 
are choosing deafness for their own sake rather than their childrens’. The 
couple cannot possibly answer the question about what their children would 
want, because they have never heard anything themselves. 
 
 Lillehammer’s ‘context’ argument has another problem. He justifies 
Candace’s and Sharon’s decision on the grounds that they are well-off and 
can provide their children with what they need in order to live happily with 
deafness. But this implies that a poor, working-class deaf couple would not be 
right to choose to have a deaf child. How can it be fair that only rich deaf 
couples can choose to have deaf children? The answer is that wealth enables 
people to make particular lifestyle choices for their children. It seems 
abhorrent that deafness should be the subject of such a choice.  Furthermore, 
it seems very strange from any perspective that a child would be better-off 
being born to poor parents than rich parents because they would therefore be 
more likely to be able to hear, yet this is what Lillehammer’s argument seems 
to suggest. Surely the ability to hear should not be dependent upon one’s 
parents being poorer than someone else’s? 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 T. Beauchamp and J. Childress. 2001. Principles of Biomedical  Ethics, 5th edition. New 
York: OUP: 100. 
Fairness, impartiality and context 
 
Shaw argues that allowing someone to run a race without having trained for it 
is nonetheless fair, while forcing him to run with a broken leg is not.23 Equally, 
the type of sub-optimality in most of Lillehammer’s examples is negligible, like 
not having trained for a race. In the case of the superhuman, the parallel 
would be taking performance-enhancing drugs before the race: this is unfair. 
Equally, deafness is like having a broken leg. These metaphors simply serve 
to illustrate the medical norm that deafness is bad: it is worth noting that, if 
Candace and Sharon died in a car crash and their offspring survived and were 
offered gene therapy to remove their deafness (were this possible, given the 
origin of the defect), they might well take it. Equally, if such therapy were 
available while they were still children and Candace and Sharon died, doctors 
would certainly presume consent to ‘remove’ deafness on the children’s 
behalf. And furthermore, to adopt a Rawlsian perspective, those behind the 
Veil of Ignorance would not permit deaf-making choices such as that 
exercised by Candace and Sharon, as they would not want to find themselves 
deaf on the lifting of the Veil. Lillehammer is wrong: impartiality tells us 
everything we need to know here. The only possible exception to this logic is 
the alternative that Candace and Sharon wouldn’t have had any children at all 
if they weren’t allowed to try for deaf ones. But as already mentioned, this was 
not the case. 
 
Lillehammer argues that, even if the couple were wrong to select for deaf 
children, “the explanation would not be exhausted by the consideration that 
they failed to maximise benefit impartially. Their failure would also consist in 
their inability to realise the essentially partial project of creating a flourishing 
family for themselves in their highly peculiar historical circumstances.”24 But 
this failure of a partial project is merely a subset of their larger impartial 
failure. They thought they had a partial justification that trumped impartial 
considerations, but they did not (and even had they succeeded, impartiality 
would still judge them as having acted wrongly). Thus their failure is 
                                                 
23 Shaw, op. cit., 62. 
24 Lillehammer, op. cit., 36. 
exhausted by impartial justifications. Also, note Lillehammer’s use of the 
phrase ‘for themselves’, which is redundant but perhaps indicative of the 
author’s awareness of the selfishness of the couple’s stance. Sharon actually 
said that “It would be nice to have a deaf child who is the same as us. I think 
that would be a wonderful experience. You know, if we can have that chance, 
why not take it?”25 One might venture to ask whether hearing is not a better 
experience than deafness, but the second sentence makes it clear whose 
benefit is the primary concern. 
 
In arguing against impartial principles, Lillehammer tends too much towards 
casuistry: he claims that “the relevant choice faced by a reasonable person in 
the deaf case is not whether to choose deafness in any arbitrary 
circumstances characteristic of our world, but whether to choose deafness in 
the particular context of a socio-economically privileged deaf community in 
early twenty-first-century California.”26 We can assume that he means this 
deaf case rather than deaf cases in general, although Sharon and Candace 
actually live in Maryland, not California.27 But although he focuses very 
closely on this particular case, Lillehammer overlooks one absolutely vital 
detail: Candace’s and Sharon’s children, given that they each have two deaf 
parents, are likely to pass on their deafness to their children. Thus the 
couple’s decision is not restricted to their children, but will also very probab
affect their grandchildren, particularly if, as a result of being brought up in the
deaf community, their children have children with other deaf people. (Given 
that the chances of the couple’s children being deaf was 50%, with four 
generations of deafness on Candy’s side and five on the sperm dono
their grandchildren will be more likely than not to be deaf if they are conceived 
with deaf partners.) All Lillehammer’s arguments about context fail here, 
because we have no way of knowing whether the grandchildren will live in a
similar so
ly 
 
r’s side, 
 
ciety.  
                                                
 
 
25 Mundy, op. cit. 
26 Lillehammer, op. cit., 39. 
27 Mundy, op. cit. 
Furthermore, there is a parallel between the couple’s decision and germ-line 
gene modification. It is widely accepted that, while somatic cell gene therapy 
is acceptable, germ-line therapy, which would also affect future generations, 
is unethical. Although their decision does not affect an already-existing entity, 
and the hereditary deafness may not be genetic (Lillehammer says it is 
congenital, which covers a wide variety of possibilities) Candace and Sharon 
are choosing to deprive their child and probably their grandchildren of one of 
the five senses that make us part of the world. It is the most fundamental 
principle of medical ethics to avoid harm. Currently, even beneficent genetic 
interventions that will affect future generations are prohibited. Lillehammer is, 
in effect, arguing that maleficent tinkering with future generations might be 
permissible. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Lillehammer mentions in a footnote that “The ethical problem of selecting for 
disabilities would remain had the deaf mother procreated with a deaf male in 
the conventional way”, attempting to argue that the couple’s status as 
lesbians does not affect the ethics here.28 (Actually, their lesbian status does 
change things slightly; an equivalent heterosexual couple would not need a 
sperm donor, as neither Candace nor Sharon is actually infertile; the donation 
is necessitated by the fact that they are both women.) Generally, deaf people 
we can perhaps accept that people should be able to choose to reproduce 
with each other if they want, even if the child will certainly be deaf, although 
this point is also disputed. But Candace and Sharon, even more so than most 
other ‘infertile’ couples, cannot reproduce with one another, necessitating a 
choice of sperm donor. When a choice is available concerning our future 
children (another example would be IVF for a heterosexual deaf couple) 
although we do not have an obligation to ‘perfect’ them as in the superhuman 
example, we do have an obligation to avoid harm. And deafness is a harm. 
The simplest impartial perspective will tell anyone that being able to hear and 
                                                 
28 Lillehammer, op. cit., 42, fn.20. 
listen to music trumps any possible risk of alienation from a particular 
community. Lillehammer states that “…in the deaf case, for example, 
philosophers concerned with social justice have naturally adopted a different 
evaluative perspective than some deaf couples wanting to start a family. 
There is no immediate prospect of a resolution of these disputes.”29 In fact, 
there is immediate prospect of resolving these disputes, because the 
philosophers are using social justice to adopt the impartial perspective of what 
is best for the future child, while the parents are choosing what they want 
without any regard for fairness.  
 
 Lillehammer concludes by stating that “While it is not obviously incoherent, 
the idea that one form of life is better than another impartially considered is a 
dangerous one.”30 But the case for avoiding deafness is overwhelming. We 
have only five senses. If we had none, we could not function in the world. It is 
clearly best, both partially and impartially, for everyone to have all their 
senses. In choosing to preserve their disability across generations, Candace 
and Sharon become mired in the partiality of their own desires and prejudices, 
fetishising the disease of deafness for its own sake. There may be a good 
way to argue against impartial principles, but Lillehammer’s example of 
choosing deafness fails to show that impartial perspectives cannot provide 
exhaustive accounts of pre-conception scenarios.  
  
 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 40. 
30 Ibid. 
